A. INTRODUCTION (1) Appointment to the Chair
On 3 January 1822 David Hume, the long-serving and distinguished Professor of Scots Law at Edinburgh University, was appointed to judicial office as a Baron of Exchequer.
1 Reacting swiftly to the news, and anticipating Hume's resignation from the Chair which was to take place on 14 January, a prominent member of the Bar wrote as follows: 
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(2) The first or inaugural lecture
Hume's final lecture to the class of Scots Law was delivered on 12 January 1822, three days before taking up his position as a Baron of Exchequer; 9 thereafter his lectures were read out by a fellow advocate, the future Lord Medwyn. 10 By the time that Bell's appointment was ratified by the Town Council, on 27 February, the session was nearing its end, and there was no need for him to assume lecturing duties until the autumn. In the intervening months Bell would have ample time to prepare his first course of lectures. This would comprise around 100 lectures, given daily from November to April between the hours of 3 and 4 pm. 11 Students ranged in age from 16 to 25, and in Bell's first year there were 257 of them. 12 There was no tradition of a special lecture to mark the new appointment, and Bell, like his predecessors, would inaugurate the Chair simply by giving the first lecture in his course. Nonetheless that lecture, given on Tuesday 12 November 1822, was evidently a special occasion. The Scotsman described the scene as follows: 13 Our readers, we imagine, will all agree that the circumstance which at present is most deserving of notice under this head, 14 is the commencement, on Tuesday last, of a Course of Lectures on Scots Law by the learned Author of COMMENTARIES ON THE BANKRUPT LAW of SCOTLAND. 15 In the groups, or we might say crowds collected in the square of the University, we observed a good many strangers, with several of the most distinguished members of the Bar. Considerable anxiety was manifested on account of its being uncertain which class room was to be occupied; and when the room was fixed upon, it was instantly crowded, and many gentlemen found it impossible to gain admission, while others could hear but very imperfectly.
As for the lecture itself, the report said no more than this:
It obviously proceeded from a mind imbued deeply with the importance and dignity of the subject, and was distinguished no less by a classic elegance of manner, than a philosophic spirit. It gave an earnest, that in the future course, practical details would be rendered illustrative of principles; and that, while the students would be taught to know what the law actually was, they would also be furnished with the means of forming an opinion of what it ought to be. Hitherto, these brief and uninformative remarks were thought to be the only surviving evidence of the content of Bell's first lecture. Recently, however, a set of student notes has become available; formerly in private hands, 16 it has now been lodged in Edinburgh University Library. The notes, which cover all of Bell's first year as professor, beginning on 12 November 1822 and ending, rather suddenly, many months later with the words "Interrupted by the Circuit", are exceptionally clear and full. They occupy 211 pages of a bound folio volume under the heading Notes on The Law of Scotland From the Lectures of Mr Bell, Edinburgh College, 1822-23. The author is unknown. The neatness of the hand suggests that the notes were written up as a fair copy after each lecture.
Of course, student notes, even good ones, are not the same as Bell's actual text. Yet in the absence of a copy of that text -and none is known to have survived -they provide as reliable an account of Bell's words as is now likely to be found. Having regard to the difficulties of capturing all that was said by someone speaking at normal speed, it may be assumed that the notes do not form a complete record of Bell's inaugural lecture. Further, the student may have chosen to be selective in what he committed to paper. There will, therefore, be omissions in the notes, and perhaps significant ones. But in respect of those parts of the lecture which the student was able or chose to record, there is no reason to question the accuracy of what he wrote -a view which, as we will see, tends to be supported by comparison with notes taken by other students in later years.
(3) Content
The introductory part of Bell's course of lectures occupies the first sixteen pages of the student's notes. 17 The length alone would indicate material which is more extensive than could possibly have been covered in Bell's initial lecture on 12 November; 18 and as the thirteenth page gives a date of 14 November, 19 it seems reasonable to suppose that the introduction was spread over two lectures or, if a lecture was also given on 13 November, over three. That being so it is not possible to know at what precise point the first, or inaugural, lecture finished. Nor, probably, does it matter very much, for it is evident from the thematic unity of the material that Bell viewed it as a single subject, regardless of the divisions imposed by the tyranny of the one-hour lecture. In that spirit there is reproduced below the notes taken on all of the introductory material. Bell's introductory material can be seen as comprising three distinct parts, indicated below by (editorial) headings. Bell begins with an account of the nature of law and of the means of studying it. Next he considers how a course of lectures might best be organised, and sets out an outline of the programme which he intends to follow. Finally, he describes the sources of law, written and unwritten, and examines the problems of authenticity in relation to early statutes and case reports.
A particular preoccupation is with the difficulty of devising a course suitable for "the different wants and the different degrees of proficiency in my hearers". 20 Later, in evidence given to the Royal Commission on the Universities of Scotland in 1826, Bell was to describe his students as follows: 21 The class which I teach is a very peculiar one; it consists not only of young men, properly academical students, who are intended for the learned professions here in Edinburgh, but of men who, without intending to submit to academical discipline, come up from the country (some of them even considerably advanced in practice), and who attend for the information which they may expect to obtain from the lectures. They therefore do not consider themselves under academical control in the same way as, in the initiatory classes, the young men are; but they attend for their own advantage when they can, or when they find advantage in it; or neglect to attend when they find it inconvenient, or useless.
The solution proposed by Bell in his lecture was to "begin with an elementary view of the whole system of our law, examining its leading principles and maxims"; later he would "go over the same ground with a more practical view, in order to qualify you for real business". 22 In the event, Bell's inexperience led him to underestimate how long it would take to deliver the first of his proposed parts, and by the time that, on 18 March 1823, he turned to the second part there was less than a month of the course left to run. The result, as the student recorded in his notes, was a much truncated treatment: 23 We have now gone over a long course of lectures, not precisely, as it will be readily observed, on the intended plan. Circumstances have led us a good deal into detail, and the consideration of practical questions, during the first view of our subject. The remainder is consequently much abridged.
The experiment of attempting a double treatment of topics does not seem to have been repeated in future years; certainly it had been abandoned by 1825-6, the next year for which we have evidence, 24 and it is absent from the text-book which Bell was soon to write for his students, the Principles of the Law of Scotland.
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Like all good teachers, Bell had evidently adjusted his ideas to the realities of the class-room. Much else in Bell's introductory material is of interest, not least because it considers topics which do not appear in any of his published works. In places he is evidently drawing from the opening title ("Of Laws in general") of Mackenzie's Institutions and Erskine's Principles and Institute, as might be expected;
26 elsewhere the material is more obviously original. Law, in Bell's view, can be reduced to a few basic principles or elements "which by their combinations come to answer all the wants of man". 27 Partly for that reason, there is "great uniformity" between all systems of law, and especially between those systems of Europe, including Scotland, which are based on Roman law. 28 It is not possible to understand any part of law properly without understanding all law because law is "one system", and to restrict oneself to a single branch to the exclusion of the rest, as in England, is "apt certainly to cramp the mind".
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To these reflections on the nature of law and legal practice, Bell adds a candid survey of the Scottish legal library. Kames is "distinctly wrong" in his views on equity; Bankton's Institute is valuable mainly for its "fine index"; Erskine's Institute "is admirable for clearness of principle, and sound sense"; but it is Stair's Institution alone which is "a work of extraordinary perfection". Finally, and as befits a professor addressing his students for the first time, Bell offers advice as to the study of the law. This "requires so much exertion that I should advise those who are lukewarm at the outset to give it up"; yet, though "arduous", "if rightly prosecuted, [it] presents no difficulties which be otherwise than animating to the spirit of youth". 30 Lecture notes, Bell warns, "are but the materials of study: it remains for every one to make the knowledge his own in his own way". 31 The sources to be used are Scottish: English law "should serve merely for illustration" and is no "authority in matters of Scotch jurisprudence". 32 For the assiduous Vol 18 2014 george joseph bell's inaugural lecture 347 student, the rewards are no less than the mastery of a system of law "which, perhaps, more than any other in ancient or modern times, will be found to promote the prosperity, happiness, and freedom of the people".
(4) Later courses of lectures
Far from being written specially for an inaugural lecture, Bell's introductory material was evidently intended for use in the years to come. That view is borne out by the only two sets of student notes known to survive from those years, for 1825-26 and for 1836-7.
34
By 1825-26, Bell's fourth year of lecturing, the preliminary material had expanded to fill no fewer than five lectures. The student's rather brief account of the first lecture has a distinctly familiar ring to it: 35 Mr Bell, in his first lecture, noticed the importance of the subject about which we were to be engaged; stated the difficulties attending the study of it; recommended other branches of literature, such as ancient and modern history, metaphysics, etc as auxiliaries to the student; warned his students of the numerous and unforeseen difficulties that attended not only the study, but the practice of the law; pointed out the respective duties of the Professor and students; stated the nature of law; and laid down a general plan of his course.
In what seems to have been for the most part new material, the next three lectures "were employed to trace the history of ancient and modern jurisprudence -particularly that of Rome, France, England, and Scotland", although there was also the familiar discussion of law and equity and of "what constituted the written and unwritten law of Scotland". 36 The final introductory lecture reverted to the pattern of the first year by considering the sources of law. 37 The other set of student notes, from 1836-7, is less full. Again the introductory material occupied the best part of five lectures and appears to have covered much the same ground as before. It is not possible to be certain about this, however, because the student missed the first and fourth lectures and gives only a sketchy account of the second and third, probably on the basis that the material did not 
(5) The transcription
In preparing the transcription which follows of the notes on Bell's inaugural lecture (or lectures), the original has been followed with only minor adjustments of punctuation and spelling. The headings are new but were suggested by the student's own headings. Some explanatory material is given in the footnotes.
B. PROFESSOR BELL'S LECTURE (1) The study of law
You are now to enter on the study of that science which is to form the chief occupation of your future life, and no occasion seems so fit as the present, when you are at the threshold of your professional existence, for taking a review of your past studies, and forming the plan of those which are to follow. The pursuits of the classics, of science, and of elegant literature, must in time give way to the more exclusive study of every man's profession: yet let them be often recurred to.
The study of law is arduous; and yet, if rightly prosecuted, presents no difficulties which should be otherwise than animating to the spirit of youth. Many people are inclined to say that theory should be confined within the limits of the academic walls, and that the object of a lawyer should be to collect precedents and to store his note book with practical information. My views are different. I can conceive the case of the note book full, while the head is empty, and shall consider my duty as best fulfilled by assisting you to settle, by a few leading rules, the landmarks and finger posts which may serve to guide you through the mazes of law.
The high duty imposed on me, as representative of the Faculty, 40 is to form pupils worthy of their body: pupils who are one day to become the living depositaries of the law, the future judges and legislators of their country, and the intrepid defenders of her noble institutions. For this career it is my highest duty 38 That the note-taker was already a practising lawyer is indicated by the explanation given for missing the fourth lecture: "Absent, being term-day". to prepare you, by directing you to the study of law in a liberal and comprehensive spirit. The limits of moral philosophy and law are often sufficiently difficult to observe. In law every duty produces a counterpart, a right demandable in courts, to be enforced by the hand of authority, of which the breach is [a] crime, followed by punishment to prevent its repetition. In ethics there is no corresponding right.
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In explaining the principles of the Law of Nations I would avoid those speculative views in which many writers have indulged, in drawing their arguments from man in a savage state and following in imagination through all the stages of society. Law is rather to be viewed in the curious and beautiful results which the Creator has made to arise from a few leading principles, interwoven with the constitution of man: in all nations the most admirable effects can be deduced from a few elements which by their combinations come to answer all the wants of man. This may be traced in physics too.
In treating of jurisprudence, such general principles should form the basis of arrangement; and the support of this view is found in the great uniformity which exists fundamentally between all systems of law, from those of the Gentoos 42 to those of the northern Indian: in all we can trace the leading lines, not to [be] eradicated by any change of circumstances. Thus the principle of selfpreservation may be recognised as the great fountain of criminal jurisprudence. Thus again in the love of property, the desire of possession natural to man, gives rise to the most beautiful arrangements of social order, and by its direct or sympathetic operation will be found a perennial spring of law which will continue to flow while man is a sociable being. Another great principle is the reliance of man on the faith of his fellows: hence arise all contracts; hence all combinations of the weak for the resistance of oppression.
It is our duty to examine how far the institutions of our country are in unison with the standard law of nature which can never err.
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Lawyers of the higher order will not omit to investigate the jurisprudence of other nations. The similarity among the laws of all modern Europe may be traced to the civil or Roman institutions. In Scotland the adoption of that system has been even more explicit than elsewhere.
After the various revolutions through which our jurisprudence has passedmilitary, agricultural, and commercial from each of which it has received some colour or addition -there has resulted a system which, perhaps, more than any other in ancient or modern times, will be found to promote the prosperity, happiness, and freedom of the people.
(2) Outline of the course
The whole subject of Scotch law is too extensive to be embraced in any single course. The consideration therefore of public law as relating to governors and the governed, and of criminal or penal jurisprudence, is for the present deferred.
The greater difficulty which presents itself in the management of this course arises from the different wants and the different degrees of proficiency in my hearers; and for this reason, it might perhaps have been better that there should be two distinct courses of Scotch law: one addressed to beginners, the other to those somewhat advanced in the study, and anxious to receive more practical instruction. As matters, however, stand this is out of the question and I have only to endeavour, by an arrangement now to be explained, to combine both objects in the same course.
It is my intention to begin with an elementary view of the whole system of our law, examining its leading principles and maxims, and the standard authorities and most important cases by which it is regulated. I shall then, in the second part of the course, proceed to go over the same ground with a more practical view, in order to qualify you for real business. It shall be my chief care that nothing shall be advanced in any part of the course, which shall not be intelligible to all in consequence of what has been said at an earlier period.
In executing this plan the difficulties I am prepared to find very considerable, and they are greatly heightened by the exalted criterion fixed by the eminent person who preceded me in this chair. Knowledge is the first requisite for a lawyer in order to secure him comfort, confidence and independence. Law has been called the noblest of all human sciences, and noble it certainly is: but the study is by no means seductive, and requires so much exertion that I should advise all those who are lukewarm at the outset to give it up. It has been said that the study of law is not calculated to open and liberalise the mind, but this remark is perhaps less applicable to the subject as treated in this country than elsewhere, at least than to the law of England; for in England, by the perfect division of labour, each lawyer applies to one branch only of law, a practice apt certainly to cramp the mind. With us it is different.
There are two difficulties, chiefly, which are apt to discourage the young lawyer, and I can speak on the subject from the recollection of my own feelings after coming to the bar. 44 The first is the consciousness of ineptitude in the midst of the overwhelming mass of law, with all its details, perplexities, and apparent contradictions. The second difficulty arises from the first: it is the fear of hidden and unknown niceties or distinctions. By the proposed plan of giving an elementary view of the subject in the first and a practical view in the second part of the course I do not despair of obviating most if not all of these obstacles.
Students in whatever stage of proficiency and of whatever destiny should now consider the law of Scotland as one system, for whatever branch is to claim their peculiar attention afterwards will be greatly assisted by a general knowledge of the whole subject.
It shall be my object to lecture rather than to compose as the author of a book: to repeat the same thing when deemed requisite and to explain my views by illustrations familiar or even colloquial. Nothing shall be advanced without an explanation.
The body of law is formed from many sources: it has been justly called the pride of human intellect and collected wisdom of ages. The law of Scotland is derived from Natural jurisprudence, Roman or Civil law, Feudal law, Canon law, mercantile and maritime policy. There has been too great a disposition of late to resort to the law of England as of authority, whereas it should serve as merely for illustration, and not always here with safety where the pure law of Scotland is concerned.
The following may serve as an outline of my plan in this course. Obligations or contracts shall be first handled: convention, the basis of all contracts; how a the influence of unhappy prejudices have, by means chiefly of the author's deserved reputation in other respects, inflicted a deeper injury on his country, than the publication of his Lectures on the General Law of Scotland could possibly do it good." For a standard Whig assessment of Hume's views on such matters, see Cockburn, Memorials of His Time (n 3) 163-164. 44 Bell was admitted as an advocate on 22 November 1791.
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Vol 18 2014 man may bind himself; the counterpart of an obligation; what law requires to complete a contract; locus poenitentiae; rei interventus; homologation; obligations conventional and obediential; joint and several; contract a mutual obligation; actions arising from contract. Next comes the consideration of property: and first of moveable property; its constitution and transference; succession. Then of heritable property, which derives its character from the feudal system: view of rise and decline of this system; property in land, in relation to use and possession, and to the titles by which it is held; the use as relating to superior and vassal; the dominium utile or proprietor's right; restraints on this right; doctrine of nuisance; of servitudes; of leases, very particularly, for almost all the land in this country is in lease, and in lease which is established on a firm basis, so as to amount to a permanent estate in land; in relation to political economy. As to titles of property the feudal law has modified influence: it is an advantage that the subject of conveyance should fall entirely into the hands of professional men, so as to be unaffected by daily usages. Charter and seisin fall thus to be explained; then naturally follow the topics registration, progression, resignation, confirmation, conditions burdening possession, and the positive prescription.
Next comes succession in moveables and land; modified by the copartnery in marriage, marriage itself may be here considered: its dissolution, and consequent rights of terce and legitim; the rules of succession; primogeniture and equal right of succession; service; apparency; passive titles; last wills and donations mortis causa; natural and legitimate children; guardian and ward; actions consequent on the above relations.
In going over the same topics in the second part of the course, conventions will be handled in reference to practice: the jurisdiction of courts; their several principles; grounds of procedure; theory and practice of evidence; what authorities are looked up to; criticisms on their weight; boroughs; corporations; parishes; teinds and paupers; election laws; consistorial, mercantile, and maritime transactions. The combination of the formerly explained elements into practice shall be kept in view in this second stage, for no transaction exists without more or less complication. Among the last subjects which shall fall to be treated are the making up of titles, and rules of competition. Last of all shall be added general hints for the direction of legal studies.
(3) Materials of Scots law
The law of Scotland, as of other countries, is divided into written and unwritten, otherwise called statutory and common law. Our statutory law is contained in the statutes before, and the statutes since the Union. In the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries attempts were repeatedly made to save from destruction the remains of our early laws. The object held out in the various commissions from the time of James I to Mary was to discover what could be relied on as authentic and what adopted as of actual force among our ancient compilations. Skene, 45 Balfour 46 and Murray 47 successively turned their attention to the subject. Reprints were made of the Regiam Majestatem. 48 The long and keen controversy on the authenticity of that compilation seems to be concluded in a satisfactory manner by the views of one of the present commissioners Mr Thomson. 49 This gentleman supposes the Regiam Majestatem to have been an English compilation, made by order of Edward II, and imposed on his new subjects of Scotland as the substance of their ancient laws. The ideas of Mr Thomson communicated to me in 1805 have lately received a singular confirmation from a quarter unknown to the author: a copy of Glanvill's work 50 has been found at Berne in Switzerland in which certain border laws and references to the usages of Scotland are interjected into the interstices of the English compilation, presenting, on the whole, an exact model of our Regiam Majestatem.
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Our unwritten, common, or consuetudinary law is derived from the ius naturae, the Civil or Roman law, equity, Feudal law, and usage. The great difficulty here is to determine what is the evidence of the common law. Our guides in this matter are first the usages or decisions of court: decisions as it were the witnesses of common law. They are the grounds on which to determine future cases, from the presumption that in determining them the common law has been well investigated by the judges. Secondly, the authority of decided cases as rules to abide by. Yet the authority of precedents is not always conclusive: for the record by which alone we are acquainted with the former proceedings of 45 court are of very variable merit in point of accuracy and selection. At one time in Scotland reports were made by the highest authorities on the bench and then they could be looked to as the most legitimate oracles. 52 Durie and Stair, Dirleton and Gosford (and of those particularly Dirleton) are our highest authorities in this respect. Of the eighteenth century the principal reporters are Elchies, Kilkerran and Kames. Kilkerran's reports form perhaps the most admirable book of the sort in this or any country. Kames cannot thus be trusted as a lawyer; his reports are the most exceptionable part of his works. From the year 1752 down to the present time the decisions of court have been reported with various degrees of merit by members of the Faculty 53 appointed for the purpose. Acts of Sederunt furnish another proof of the common law. These are of various sorts, but in general take the form of declaratory decisions, judicially ascertaining disputed points. The court here often exerts its powers of equity, in the establishment of rules for future cases. These powers should be exerted with extreme delicacy and caution.
Yet another ground of common law is recognised in the forms of deeds, proofs etc which may be considered as embodying the usages of the times, and as thus becoming evidence of the common law. Mackenzie in speaking of styles, says that they are to the lawyer as the chart to the geographer, the compass to the sailor. Sir William Blackstone, on this principle, calls the registrum brevium "the very foundation of the common law".
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As to statutes subsequent to the Union, the black letter edition is received and conclusive by 41 Geo 3 c 90 s 9. 55 An official publication of the statutes at large has been ordered. Thomson has besides published the Acts since the Union in fourteen volumes. In questions as to an Act reference should be always made to the fountain head without trusting a quotation or copy. It is a nice question how far usage can abolish an Act. In England to make a usage good it must have 52 For details of the collections referred to by Bell, see J S Leadbetter, "The printed law reports ) is the oldest book of English Common Law, containing the texts of the forms of writs accepted in the courts. The full quotation is: "It is likewise well known, that there is no legal argument which hath such force in our courts of law, as those which are drawn from the words of antient writs; and that the Registrum Brevium is looked upon to be the very foundation of the common law". I owe this reference to Martin Hogg. 55 The Crown Debts Act 1801 (41 Geo 3 c 90) s 9 provided that post-Union statutes "printed and published by the Printers duly authorized to print and publish the same by His Majesty, or by any of his Royal Predecessors, shall be received as conclusive Evidence" in all courts.
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george joseph bell's inaugural lecture 355 endured so that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary. When there is a dispute as to usage, arguments may be drawn from writs, forms, decisions and Acts of Sederunt. A series rerum judicatorum 56 is not to be overruled by any appeal to reason, as was strongly exemplified today (14 Nov 1822) in a question as to the writer's privilege of retention. 57 How far expediency may be pleaded in any case it is difficult to determine. It may be admitted when touching on a usage in the ordinary transaction of business, but not even then if against an established rule.
The doctrine of Equity is received very differently in England and in Scotland. See Blackstone 58 and Selden. 59 In England Common Law is separated from Equity; in Scotland the two are blended: our courts are courts of law and equity, our law a compound of common law, civil law, and equity. The Roman law, though never of authority, is an inexhaustible source of illustration. Kames 60 injudiciously separates law and equity and attempts to establish an opposition between them quite out of place with reference to Scotland where they go hand in hand. In England the principles of equity are as distinctly ascertained as any others, and do not vary with the mind of the Chancellor. Equity is declared to be the soul, spirit and essence of English law. Kames is distinctly wrong in his conceptions of the whole matter, and it does not appear that Blackstone had the proper impressions of the peculiar nature of equity. 61 
